Political Competition and Housing Budget during election years in Chile from 1990 to 2015
Authors
-
Juan Pablo Urrutia Muñoz
University of Chile
http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2019-006X
Abstract
The national housing budget is determined by many variables in addition to that of housing deficit. Electoral competition is one of these variables and thus becomes a key aspect to study in order to understand one of the driving forces behind housing investment. Through quantitative-descriptive methods and correlational analysis, this paper uses secondary information to examine the Chilean public budget and the results of presidential elections over the 1990-2015 period. The results suggest that each administration modified the housing budget during electoral periods, a situation that grew in intensity when there was greater opposition. In addition, it is possible to observe that the ruling parties demonstrated their economic power through “costly gestures” with major investments and the provision of housing subsidies to validate their capacity. However at the same time, like in a “repetitive game” voters observed that these efforts were only made during electoral years, thus being interpreted as electoral populism instead of a demonstration of efficacy.References
Aidt, T.S., Veiga, F., y Veiga, L. (2011). Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model. Public choice, 148(1-2), 21-44. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9644-3
Alt, J.E. y Lassen, D.D. (2006). Transparency, political polarization, and political budget cycles in OECD countries. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 530-550. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00200.x
Banco Mundial. (s.f.). Chile. Recuperado de http://data.worldbank.org/country/chile
Brender, A. y Drazen. (2005). Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(7), 1271-1295. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.04.004
Canes-Wrone, B., Herron, M.C., y Shotts, K.W. (2001). Leadership and pandering: A theory of executive policymaking. American Journal of Political Science, 45(3), 532-550. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669237
Castro, V. y Martins, R. (2016). Are there political cycles hidden inside government expenditures? Applied Economics Letters, 23(1), 34-37. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2015.1047084
Chile Ministerio de Hacienda. (s.f.) Estado de operaciones del gobierno central 1990 – 2017. Recuperado de http://www.dipres.gob.cl/594/w3-propertyvalue-15494.html
Chile Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación. (1998). Impacto de la política habitacional chilena. Santiago: Autor.
Chile Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo. (2004). Un siglo de políticas en vivienda y barrio. Santiago: Autor.
Drazen, A. y Eslava, M. (2010). Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 92(1), 39-52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.01.001
Efthyvoulou, G. (2012). Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures. Public Choice, 153(3-4), 295-327. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9795-x
Eibl, F. y Lynge-Mangueira, H. (2017). Electoral confidence and political budget cycles in non-OECD countries. Studies in Comparative International Development, 52(1), 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-016-9230-x
Katsimi, M. y Sarantides, V. (2012). Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? Public Choice, 151(1), p. 325-362. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9749-8
Khemani, S. (2004). Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the Indian states. Journal of Development Economics, 73(1), 125-154. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.01.002
Maskin, E. y Tirole, J. (2004). The politician and the judge: Accountability in government. American Economic Review, 94(4), 1034-1054. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828042002606
Nordhaus, W.D. (1975). The political business cycle. The Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), 169-190. https://doi.org/10.2307/2296528
Persson, T. y Tabellini, G. (1990). Macroeconomic policy, credibility and politics. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis.
Persson, T. y Tabellini, G. (2003). Do electoral cycles differ across political systems? Milan: IGIER.
Rogoff, K. (1987). Equilibrium political budget cycles. Cambridge, MA.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Rogoff, K. y Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. The Review of Economic Studies, 55(1), 1-16. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297526
Shi, M. y Svensson, J. (2002). Conditional political budget cycles. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Shi, M. y Svensson, J. (2006). Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why? Journal of Public Economics, 90(8-9), 1367-1389. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.009
Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), p. 355-374. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010
Vergne, C. (2009). Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1), 63-77. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.09.003
Alt, J.E. y Lassen, D.D. (2006). Transparency, political polarization, and political budget cycles in OECD countries. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 530-550. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00200.x
Banco Mundial. (s.f.). Chile. Recuperado de http://data.worldbank.org/country/chile
Brender, A. y Drazen. (2005). Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(7), 1271-1295. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.04.004
Canes-Wrone, B., Herron, M.C., y Shotts, K.W. (2001). Leadership and pandering: A theory of executive policymaking. American Journal of Political Science, 45(3), 532-550. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669237
Castro, V. y Martins, R. (2016). Are there political cycles hidden inside government expenditures? Applied Economics Letters, 23(1), 34-37. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2015.1047084
Chile Ministerio de Hacienda. (s.f.) Estado de operaciones del gobierno central 1990 – 2017. Recuperado de http://www.dipres.gob.cl/594/w3-propertyvalue-15494.html
Chile Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación. (1998). Impacto de la política habitacional chilena. Santiago: Autor.
Chile Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo. (2004). Un siglo de políticas en vivienda y barrio. Santiago: Autor.
Drazen, A. y Eslava, M. (2010). Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 92(1), 39-52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.01.001
Efthyvoulou, G. (2012). Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures. Public Choice, 153(3-4), 295-327. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9795-x
Eibl, F. y Lynge-Mangueira, H. (2017). Electoral confidence and political budget cycles in non-OECD countries. Studies in Comparative International Development, 52(1), 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-016-9230-x
Katsimi, M. y Sarantides, V. (2012). Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? Public Choice, 151(1), p. 325-362. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9749-8
Khemani, S. (2004). Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the Indian states. Journal of Development Economics, 73(1), 125-154. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.01.002
Maskin, E. y Tirole, J. (2004). The politician and the judge: Accountability in government. American Economic Review, 94(4), 1034-1054. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828042002606
Nordhaus, W.D. (1975). The political business cycle. The Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), 169-190. https://doi.org/10.2307/2296528
Persson, T. y Tabellini, G. (1990). Macroeconomic policy, credibility and politics. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis.
Persson, T. y Tabellini, G. (2003). Do electoral cycles differ across political systems? Milan: IGIER.
Rogoff, K. (1987). Equilibrium political budget cycles. Cambridge, MA.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Rogoff, K. y Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. The Review of Economic Studies, 55(1), 1-16. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297526
Shi, M. y Svensson, J. (2002). Conditional political budget cycles. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Shi, M. y Svensson, J. (2006). Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why? Journal of Public Economics, 90(8-9), 1367-1389. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.009
Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), p. 355-374. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010
Vergne, C. (2009). Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1), 63-77. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.09.003
Twitter
Facebook
